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Abstract 
This article examines partisan political commemorations and their impact on peacebuilding in 
ethno-national settings. It considers how commemoration can assume highly partisan, 
ideological frames working to exacerbate conflict but also argues that partisan forms of 
commemoration may be used in a more pragmatic, adaptive fashion that may underwrite 
peaceful politics. Whilst arguing this, the article notes that partisan commemoration can 
remain as a drag on peacebuilding, and so posits ways of counterbalancing this negative 
aspect, drawing on a case study examination of the ‘Decade of Centenaries’ in Northern 
Ireland. Proposals to facilitate adaptive commemoration, and foster activities that counter 
balance more partisan commemoration, are considered. 
 
Keywords: Commemoration, Political Memory, Memorials, Peacebuilding, Ethno-
Nationalism 
 
Introduction 
This paper examines the political commemoration of periods of violence and conflict as an 
important aspect of political activity that impacts on peacebuilding within ethno-national 
settings. Commemoration is understood as particularly important where the lines of fracture 
correspond to ethno-national identity.  
The article examines how we can best understand and engage with forms of ethno-national 
commemoration, which are often distinctly partisan and one sided in their presentation of 
narratives of past conflict. The paper reasons that commemoration serves as a vital means to 
manage and maintain ethno-national constituencies during periods of peacebuilding– whether 
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in a peace process or political ‘unsettlement’. Using short illustrative case studies from 
Northern Ireland and Lebanon, the argument is advanced that partisan commemoration often 
displays two facets. Firstly, it can indeed act to underwrite militancy and militarism, 
effectively sharpening a symbolic conflict over the meaning of the past in the present. This 
may damage attempts at peacebuilding. Yet partisan commemoration can also display a 
second facet: it can promulgate a more pragmatic adaptation of these partisan forms of ‘hot’ 
memory, one which reframes them to underwrite more peaceful methods or environments, 
and attune key constituencies to necessary shifts in the political dispensation. This is 
conceptualised as adaptive commemoration. 
Partisan commemoration may thus be Janus faced – at once helping to embed peace in 
important constituencies, whilst also hardening boundaries between groups with a history of 
enmity. These two facets are not mutually exclusive and can co-exist. The paper lastly 
considers how adaptive commemoration may be bolstered by a wider societal engagement 
with a critical-inclusive commemoration; one which may serve to partially defuse or mitigate 
political commemoration when it takes the form of a war by other means.   
 
Peace and the Importance of Commemoration in Deeply Divided Societies 
The political use of commemoration matters in societies emerging from conflict. A survey of 
case studies and more comparative research in ethno-nationally divided societies reveals that 
public memory work in relation to conflict is quite prolific.1 Politically partisan, ethno-
                                                          
1 Laleh Khalili, Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Elisabetta Viggiani, Talking Stones: The 
Politics of Memorialization in Post-Conflict Northern Ireland. (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
2014); Mara Albrecht and Bassel Akar, The Power of Remembrance: Political Parties, 
Memory and Learning about the Past in Lebanon (Cologne: forumZFD, 2016); Yiannis 
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nationalist, and often antagonistic, forms of commemoration predominate in such settings.2 
More inclusive forms of commemoration and memorialisation do exist in divided societies, 
but they are distant competitors to the partisan.3 How much of this politically partisan 
commemoration accurately reflects the prevailing mood within deeply divided societies may 
be open to debate, and relatively few studies have attempted to gauge audience understanding 
of, and empathy with, such commemoration. Yet these commemorations are numerous, and 
can involve thousands of participants at one end of the scale, or at least display clear local 
rootedness at the smaller end. Levels of whole hearted support and engagement may vary, but 
support nevertheless appears significant and authentic; this is not simply the work of ethnic 
entrepreneurs pulling puppet strings, with their target constituencies responding 
mechanically. 
This engagement with commemoration reflects the critical importance of group narratives in 
creating histories and fostering a sense of collective identity in ethno-national settings.4 
Collective memory is particularly important in helping form a collective identity as it forges a 
shared sense of the past and common purpose by allowing the group to physically come 
                                                          
Papadakis, ‘Nation, narrative and commemoration: Political ritual in divided 
Cyprus’,  History and Anthropology 14 (1),  (2003): 253-270. 
2 Anna Di Lellio and Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers. ‘Sacred Journey to a Nation: The 
Construction of a Shrine in Postwar Kosovo’, Journeys 7 (1)  (2006): 27-49; Kris Brown and 
Adrian Grant. ‘A Lens Over Conflicted Memory: Surveying ‘Troubles’ Commemoration in 
Northern Ireland’  Irish Political Studies 31 (1), (2016): 139-162;   Craig Larkin, Memory 
and Conflict in Lebanon: Remembering and Forgetting the Past, ( London: Routledge, 2012) 
 
3 Balkan Insight, ‘Conflicting Memories Post war Balkan Monuments in Focus’. 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/page/balkan-transitional-justice-memorialisation-
conflicting-memories. (Accessed 15 October 2017); Brown and Grant, ‘A Lens Over 
Conflicted Memory: Surveying ‘Troubles’ Commemoration in Northern Ireland’. 
4 Marc Howard Ross, Culture and Belonging in Divided Societies: Contestation and Symbolic 
Landscapes (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012); Anthony D. Smith, The 
Power of Ethnic Traditions in the Modern World (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2007) 
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together as the group, by disseminating narratives that attempt to bind and guide, and by 
underwriting political positions with a sense of powerful, sacral emotion. The narratives 
within commemorations are organising myths; myths not in the sense of being wholly 
fictitious, but through being simplified guides to political understanding and action. These 
narratives, and their accompanying symbolism, become even more potent and politically 
useful in moments of change or crisis.5  
Peace processing, transitions, or an ‘unsettled’ constitutional agreement, see moments of 
crisis and turbulence. Elites must sell compromises, bring along their base, and thwart splits, 
challengers and spoilers.  Constructing a convincing and evocative narrative that supports 
their position, and then communicating it convincingly to their constituencies is key. Political 
commemorations are suitably resonant, and provide a ready-made audience of the faithful. 
Political commemoration, even of ‘hot’ periods of political violence, is also malleable.  The 
polyvalence of commemorative material culture is not only high, but the repertoire of 
materials is itself vast. This gives commemoration a large adaptive capacity.  As Olick notes6  
collective memory can be usefully framed as ‘a variety of products and practices’ near 
infinite in type. The plethora of forms of practice is replicated in many settings of ethno-
national conflict as can be seen from studies of the Basque country7, Northern Ireland8 and 
                                                          
5 Stuart J Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2001) 
6 Jeffrey K Olick, ‘From Collective Memory to the Sociology of Mnemonic Practices and 
Products’, 158 in Cultural Memory Studies: an International and Interdisciplinary 
Handbook ed. Astrid Erll, Ansgar Nünning, and Sara B. Young (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. , 
2008): 151-162. 
7 John P Linstroth, ‘The Basque Conflict Globally Speaking: Material Culture, Media and 
Basque Identity in the Wider World’,  Oxford Development Studies 30 (2), (2002): 205-222. 
8 Brown and Grant, ‘A Lens Over Conflicted Memory: Surveying ‘Troubles’ 
Commemoration in Northern Ireland’ 
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Palestine9. Indeed, even a single communal actor, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, can expand 
their memory products into a fully-fledged national and regional media strategy.10 
This valued engagement with commemoration chimes with Kertzer’s11 analysis that such 
political rituals foster a sense of higher political purpose, to be part of something important, 
meaningful and above the ordinary. When one is engaged in this process with other 
individuals, strong affective bonds are created, at least for a time. Kertzer goes so far as to 
say that political ritual is a necessary way of producing political solidarity. It is a valued 
political resource in that it provides a sense of common identification; it legitimises power 
relations between elites and grassroots constituencies (or serves to delegitimise rival 
leadership claims on a constituency); it can serve to produce strong emotive support or 
resistance to the state; and it can facilitate the creation or replenishment of new leaderships, 
as ritual is used to underwrite the legitimacy of a new ‘top table’.12 
As noted, commemoration as political ritual incorporates a high degree of symbolism. These 
often comprise ‘condensation symbols’ - illustrations and representations, words, phrases and 
maxims which evoke forceful values and thumbnail sketched narratives which serve as easily 
propagated concepts that can prime for action13.  In ethno-national settings, these are defined 
as ‘myth symbol complexes’  - schemata that explain a groups values, interests, and fears by 
a narration of the past and use it as a compass to mobilisation in the present and future. As 
                                                          
9 Khalili, Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration 
10 Paula Schmitt, Advertised to Death: Lebanese Poster Boys (Beirut: Paula Schmitt, 2009); 
Lina Khatib, Dina Matar, and Atef Alshaer, The Hizbullah Phenomenon: Politics and 
Communication (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 
 
11 David I. Kertzer, Ritual, Politics, and Power. (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1988) 
12 Kertzer, Ritual, Politics and Power, 169-177 
13 David S. Kaufer, and Kathleen M. Carley. ‘Condensation Symbols: Their Variety and 
Rhetorical Function in Political Discourse’, Philosophy & Rhetoric 26 (3), (1993): 201-226. 
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Kaufman notes, this makes them useful templates for ethnic entrepreneurs to attempt to bind 
communities to a particular course of action, often one of conflict.14 Indeed, such 
condensation symbols are particularly useful in times of widespread social change and power 
shifts, but not always as an impetus to upheaval. Condensation symbols allow communities to 
‘drop their heaviest cultural anchors’ and thus provide a potentially stabilising influence.15 
 
Partisan Commemoration – A Form of War or Adaptation to Peace? 
 Still, the nature and utility of partisan commemoration in ethno-national societies has been 
open to interpretation. One analysis emphasises that partisan commemoration essentially 
comprises a ‘war by other means’. This may take a very direct form, such as when 
commemoration is used to delegitimise the values, actions and standing of an ethno-national 
opponent group, whilst promoting the values, action and standing of one’s own group.16 
Commemoration thus validates political claims making in the present. Commemoration can 
also be used to assert or demonstrate power and control in a geographic area, be it local 
neighbourhood or the state itself.17  
These interpretations have accuracy and value, but do not reflect all the important facets of 
ethno-national commemoration. Other research has brought to light an adaptive role that 
communal commemoration can play in ethno-national societies. Conway has shown how 
commemoration of the Bloody Sunday massacre had expanded in a series of phases away 
                                                          
14 Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War 
15 Anthony Cohen, The Symbolic Construction of Community (Chichester: Ellis Horwood, 
1985),101-102 
16 Sara McDowell and Máire Braniff. Commemoration as Conflict: Space, Memory and Identity in 
Peace Processes (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 
17 Sara McDowell, "Armalite, the Ballot Box and Memorialization: Sinn Féin and the State in 
post-Conflict Northern Ireland’, The Round Table 96(393),  (2007): 725-738. 
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from an exclusively ethno-nationalist frame, whilst still remaining rooted in local, highly 
segregated communities.18 Khalili has examined a shift in Palestinian commemorative form 
and discourse which has accentuated notions of human rights and a suffering, civilian, 
victimhood whilst maintaining  a divergent commemoration of armed resistance.19 A similar 
process is observable within commemoration amongst the Tamil diaspora. 20 Turning to 
Lebanon, Volk has noted that the commemorations within a particular sect’s territory and 
organised by its own confessional elite, have sometimes been re-framed to include another 
‘out’ group, or evoke an over-arching, inclusive national identity.21  
Studies like the above have thus highlighted an undercurrent within partisan commemoration, 
one which partially recalibrates conflict narratives, nuances political messaging yet also 
works to maintain group cohesion in a changing political scene.  We can better unpack this 
tension within partisan commemoration, often antagonistic to inclusive form of memory but 
also adaptive to, and supportive of peace by examining the cases of Lebanon and Northern 
Ireland.  
Two Case Studies - Understanding the Uses of Partisan Commemoration 
In order to examine partisan forms of political commemoration in more detail and tease out 
its implications, two short case studies may serve as illustrative examples of the processes at 
work. Each case study, examining political commemoration in Lebanon, and within Irish 
Republicanism in Northern Ireland, discusses the means by which commemoration serves to 
                                                          
18 Brian Conway, ‘Rethinking Difficult Pasts: Bloody Sunday (1972) as a Case 
Study’. Cultural Sociology 3 (3),(2009): 397-413. 
19 Khalili, Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine 
20 Tom O’Neill, ‘In the Path of Heroes: Second-Generation Tamil-Canadians after the 
LTTE." Identities 22 (1),  (2015): 124-139. 
 
21 Lucia Volk, Memorials and Martyrs in Modern Lebanon. (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2010 
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ideologise conflict and foster cohesion within groups, and also maintain boundaries between 
groups. Our focus then moves on to examine how commemoration by ethnic partisans can 
also shift to pragmatically adapt to more peaceful forms of political interaction and claims 
making, effectively using the memory of conflict to guide their constituents in time of peace. 
The twin cases of Lebanon and Northern Ireland are deliberately selected to highlight how 
partisan commemoration can adjust its narrative framing and evolve more nuanced 
approaches to different political dispensations. There is no insinuation that such evolution is a 
universal phenomenon across all types of ethno-national commemoration; but the regional 
spread of the ethno-nationalisms and conflicts, emerging from western Europe and the 
Middle East, shows that this process of adaptation can cut across different political cultures. 
We turn first to commemoration as a force which underwrites divisions between groups, 
amplifying themes of militancy, martyrdom and militarism, using Lebanon as the first 
example. 
 
Partisan Commemoration as Cementing Conflict 
The ideological uses of partisan ethnic memory in a divided society such as Lebanon can be 
readily articulated. In a society in which politics is organised on a confessional ethno-
religious basis, commemoration acts as part of the foundations for political identity. Through 
its construction of binding narratives and its reification of the community by physically 
bringing the group together as the group, commemoration works to foster strong in group 
attachment and create boundaries with any ‘out’ groups. Ethno-religious commemoration 
thus mitigates the twin threats of apathy and non-sectarian identification which may inhibit a 
confessional party’s political strength. Commemorating martyrs is particularly powerful as 
martyrdom is seen to give credibility and legitimacy to the political parties’ worldviews. The 
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symbolic value of the martyr lies in a claim of heroism and steadfastness, and has proved a 
currency that Lebanese parties strived to display.22 It also provides present day strength by 
constructing a line of continuity with the past; the values of those martyred remains true to 
ideological core of the political party in the present – thus the party appears resolute, morally 
driven, and authentic. It shows its historical roots, allowing it to portray itself as embedded in 
its constituency, as something more than a political party with all the baggage of horse 
trading and cynicism that may accompany that label. Martyrdom, a concept and status which 
combines heroism, bearing witness, and victimhood in one package, is also highly useful in 
adjusting difficult narratives. Parties have employed the commemoration of martyrs to 
reframe their losses on the battlefield, whether a literal battlefield or a political contest. 
Amongst Lebanese ethno-religious parties the invocation of the martyr can enable a claim to 
moral victory, even if a political loss to a communal ‘other’ is apparent.23  Commemoration 
also allows a very practical demonstration of political power; large, well-attended 
commemorations which create ‘spectacles’ via stagecraft and powerful use of symbols shows 
strength and publicly stages the party as a powerful actor in the political field. 
Commemoration further serves to legitimise one’s present policies by invoking success (past 
victories) and commitment (past sacrifice). In Lebanon, such a valuable legitimising theme 
emerges in the concept  of ‘resistance’. Groups compete for the title of ‘resistance’, and for 
the right to define what ‘resistance’ is. Hezbollah organises a regular and resource heavy 
calendar of commemoration which helps defend and define the groups ‘resistance’ project 
and its current maintenance of an armed organisation.24 Other parties, such as the Christian 
Lebanese Forces, Kata’eb or the Sunni Future Movement use their own commemorations to 
                                                          
22 Yasmine Dabbous, Khaled Nasser, and Farah Dabbous. ‘ “Across the Bridge of Death” The 
Culture of Martyrdom in Lebanon 1960s-1980s’,  International Journal of Cultural 
Studies 13 (6), (2010): 593-615. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Albrecht and Akar, The Power of Remembrance, 27. 
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challenge Hezbollah for the title of the true resistance, and de-legitimise its usurpation of the 
state’s monopoly on the use of force. Aside from definitional and legitimacy contests, 
Hezbollah’s commemoration has an additional role: one of suffusing a strong sense of ethno-
religious belonging and cementing a boundary between them and other communities; 
commemoration forms a facet of their wider strategy for creating an Islamic milieu, that will 
saturate the political, social and cultural sphere of the Shi’a community.25 
 
Party political commemoration can serve as a highly partisan ideological instrument in 
Northern Ireland too.26 Although commemorations of the more recent ‘Troubles’ may be 
organised by a great number of organisation types and private individuals or families, Irish 
Republican and Ulster Loyalist commemorations tend to predominate, and are strongly 
attached to parties, political associations, and groups of former or current paramilitaries.27 
Those who attend or spectate at such commemorations, extend beyond party members or 
close political affiliates. Given that commemorations, of whatever size, usually take place in 
areas of local political support, this is hardly surprising. Small neighbourhood 
commemorations may only attract a few dozen of spectators, but larger proceedings that 
commemorate highly important individuals and events see thousands taking part, and 
thousands more spectating. Taking Irish Republicanism as an example, we can see how 
commemorative narratives seek to construct legitimacy by linking to earlier forms of 
separatist violence. These narratives ground their ideological project in sanctified history by 
                                                          
25 Lara Deeb and Mona Harb. ‘Politics, Culture, Religion: How Hizbullah is Constructing an 
Islamic Milieu in Lebanon’, Review of Middle East Studies 43 (2)  (2009): 198-206. 
26 Analysis of Irish Republican commemoration in this section is largely based on field 
observation of public commemorative activity (60+ events) from 2006 to the present. 
27 Brown and Grant, ‘A Lens Over Conflicted Memory: Surveying ‘Troubles’ 
Commemoration in Northern Ireland’ 
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demonstrating or constructing links with earlier iterations of struggle, espoused as wars of 
liberation, many of which are themselves now legitimised by official commemorations in the 
independent Irish state. Republican violence in the modern ‘Troubles’ is then narrated in text, 
speech, or symbol as a ‘war’ itself, and merely the latest expression of past conflicts. Former 
paramilitaries of the more recent ‘Troubles’ are feted, and projected as ordinary people who 
showed extraordinary commitment and courage, and thus worthy of emulation. This is an 
important activity, as through the course of these ‘Troubles’ republican violence was labelled 
by most political actors, including both the UK and Ireland, as terrorism. Republicans chafed 
at this criminalisation and devoted considerable resources of time and energy in countering it 
during the conflict; this process continues even as they have now abjured violence and 
enjoyed remarkable political success (and elite acceptance) in Ireland North and South.   
Claims of legitimacy for past action are further augmented by narratives, and sometimes 
theatre or street theatre, which depicts injustice perpetrated against Republicans and the wider 
Nationalist community in the form of repression by the security forces, an unjust criminal 
justice system, and state sponsored assassination. This street theatre can often incorporate 
more militant imagery, one of men and women carrying replica weaponry representing an 
armed paramilitary response to this perceived injustice.28  The communal ‘other’ -the 
Unionist and Loyalist communities-  are not always foregrounded in commemorations but 
when they are, their political expressions may be presented in terms of hostility and threat.  
Commemoration seeks further legitimacy for the current Republican project, not simply by 
invoking icons of national history, and not just by spotlighting the memory of past injustices 
emerging from an ‘out’ group, but by constructing narratives of popular support and local 
rootedness. 29 Republican commemorations stress the regeneration of post 1969 
                                                          
28 Brown and Grant, ‘Lens over Conflicted Memory’, 152-153. 
29 McDowell, ‘Armalite and Ballot Box’. 
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republicanism as a popular reaction emerging from injustice, discrimination and repressive 
security measures. In short, it is rooted not just in history and the mythologies of nationalism 
but from the ‘peoples’ experiences themselves.  Thus, Republican violence becomes 
communal defence and defiance as well as national liberation; the maintenance of a 
continued unity between the people and the now purely political project of Republicanism is 
narrated as being necessary, efficacious and a natural evolution. The methods change: but 
commemorations teach that the goals, values, and the need for a continued unity remain 
constants.30 In narrating and commemorating a period of political violence, themes of 
legitimacy, historical continuity, and the binding of the communal group are thus woven 
together. These themes aim to cohere the group and its identity, and support the rightfulness 
of contemporary group actions and values, in the present.  
Partisan Commemoration as Pragmatic Adaptation to Peace 
Yet, the partisan commemoration of periods of political violence do not simply act as a ‘war 
by other means’, ideologizing and fixing conflict memory. Irish Republicanism 
commemoration by Sinn Féin, the largest republican party, has incorporated narratives and 
messaging within its commemorative practice which may be construed as a more pragmatic 
adaptation to the new political dispensation over the last decade. It has achieved great 
electoral success, but has also been faced with the ideological problem of administering 
Northern Ireland as part of the British state, something deemed anathema before the 
outworking of the Northern Ireland peace.  This group’s commemorative activity in relation 
to the modern ‘Troubles’ is energetic, numerous, and often closely connected to, and within, 
local neighbourhoods of support. As such, it represents a very effective means of messaging 
                                                          
30 Kevin Bean, The New Politics of Sinn Féin. (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 
2007):126 
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to its political constituency; one that seeks to chart new political courses, and to mitigate 
doubts and fears, whilst simultaneously reassuring constituents of the continuity of its 
political values. For Irish Republicans, memorialisation has demonstrated a remarkable 
political utility. The very act of commemorating and indeed celebrating past fighters and 
activists stresses the ideological commitment of the leadership to the overall political project; 
they have not forgotten where the political project came from (the streets and rural 
townlands), its core values of resistance and eventual goal of national unity. 31 Rather than 
simply being an ideological deadweight, inhibiting political compromise, the dead and the 
memory of campaigns of violence are used as a symbolic ballast, serving to steady the 
movement’s political re-calibration to peace.  Any disjuncture of remembering militant 
violence whilst advocating peaceful politics is avoided by reframing the ‘armed struggle’ as a 
distinct phase that is now superseded: Messages in commemorations have projected politics 
as a new phase of the struggle for Irish unity; the purely political arena is thus a proper, 
natural and appropriate continuation of the struggle. The continuity that is crafted between 
the dead and the living is not one of militant means, but of political goals, commitment and 
values.  
A Republican Commemoration – Continuity, Adaptivity and Pragmatism 
The 2006 Hunger Strike commemoration organised by Sinn Féin to remember the 25th 
anniversary of the 10 men who died in a prison fast against the terms of their imprisonment, 
offers a good example of this narrative process.32 The form and spectacle of the 
commemoration has remained broadly the same in later years. This instance also took place 
at a time in the peace process when Republicanism was moving towards a recalibrated 
                                                          
31 Brown and Grant, ‘A Lens over Conflicted Memory’; Elisabetta Viggiani, Talking stones: 
the politics of memorialization in post-conflit Northern Ireland. (Oxford: Berghahn, 2015) 
 
32 Field notes, west Belfast, 13th  August 2006 
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political agreement which would see them accept policing and criminal justice structures for 
the first time, and share power with a more ‘hard line’ variant of Unionism. The 
commemoration itself can be divided into two halves.  The first saw a march of Sinn Féin 
supporters towards the Casement Park sporting grounds in west Belfast. Many colourful Irish 
Republican flute bands took part and the various Sinn Féin cumainn (party branches) carried 
banners picturing Irish Republican Army (IRA) members killed in the more recent conflict, 
or historical figures associated with earlier periods of violence. The remembered individuals 
are sometimes pictured in uniform or with weaponry. As the parade passed many spectators 
stepped off the pavement to fall in behind and become a part of the procession. As the march 
proceeds, the narration unfolds in a series of tableaux vivant or pieces of street theatre.  This 
narrative depicts the vicissitudes of IRA activism, and that of the hungers strikers 
particularly.  These scenes and representations portrayed house raids by the security forces, 
interrogation by the Police, trial and conviction, incarceration and protest, hospitalization on 
hunger strike, and ultimately death and communal mourning. Some scenes seek to inspire not 
only pathos or anger, but also derision.  In one scene representing criminal justice, an actor in 
a comically outsize British judge’s regalia repeatedly bangs his gavel and berates the crowd 
for their disloyalty and opposition to British rule.  Puppet strings suspend from his waving 
arms.   
The second part of the commemoration saw a concluding rally take place in sporting grounds, 
professionally equipped with address system, electronic screen and temporary stage. 
Thousands were in attendance, and most clapped and cheered to the sight of hundreds of 
former IRA prisoners parading into the venue and forming a military style column in the 
centre of the field.  Gerry Adams, the Sinn Féin President at that time, made the keynote 
speech which deftly drew together the threads of Republican continuity and transformation, 
and resistance and negotiation. Adams reminded the audience that the IRA were threaded 
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through that Republican constituency; they were ‘the people sitting close to you’ not an 
historical abstract. Yet militarism was quite absent from the messaging.  Quotations from the 
iconic hunger striker Bobby Sands were used to argue the need for ‘strategic compromises’ in 
the future; indeed strategic thinking and political engagement were important themes of the 
speech.  The hunger strikers were invoked as exemplars of shrewd political analysis, 
planning, and of the need to remain unified through challenging political action. As such, 
they became guiding lights for a transforming Irish Republicanism. Simultaneously, their 
sacrifice was imagined as being in a direct line of continuity with past heroes of previous 
struggles.  History now served as a compass point to future political re-orientation.  The 
political values of the hunger strikes were presented as being still imprinted on the Sinn Féin; 
For Adams, their powerful memory was imagined as ever present in the ongoing political 
process, ‘keeping us [Republican leaders] right’ in negotiations with the British. As powerful, 
yet malleable symbols, the Republican dead can thus be used  to underwrite Republican 
compromise and transformation.  
Counterintuitively, the energetic remembrance of political violence and martyrdom thus 
becomes a way of validating ideological shifts and political compromise. This memory of 
violence is not always shied away from; indeed, it often emerges in nostalgic tales of shared 
comradeship and ‘derring-do’ during eulogies.  On some occasions the campaign of violence 
is narrated as having gone as far as it could realistically go, and that peaceful politics was the 
only avenue left open to pursuing Republican goals.33 The theme of the withering of the 
‘Orange state’ is a strong one in commemorations, and clearly there is a wish to communicate 
to their constituency what the movement has banked, both through militant mobilisation in 
the past, and through an electoral success in the present which has propelled it into 
government in a power sharing executive. Again, the message is thus of continuity and 
                                                          
33 Field notes from Lenadoon Martyrs Commemoration, 29 September 2012. 
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banking successes, on the path to eventual unification; commemoration serves to reassure 
that goals and values remain the same, and that new strategies are achieving success, even as 
ideological shifts have taken place.34 Commemoration also allows mainstream Republicanism 
to hold the memory of the dead, a valuable political symbol, close to their own political 
project, and away from ‘usurping’ spoiler groups engaged in violence. Indeed, Sinn Féin 
leaders have used eulogies to de-legitimise what they term ‘micro-groups’ and fend off their 
claims to appropriate useful martyrs and histories.  
At times, their commemoration can even be used to validate a more reflective position in 
relation to the memory of political violence.  During a commemoration of the ‘Battle of 
Ballymacarrett’, a riot and gun battle at a communal interface, Sinn Féin President Gerry 
Adams said that commemorations in relation the forthcoming ‘Decade of Centenaries’ could 
become reflective and a means towards historically informed identities: 
...there is an opportunity as we approach these [centenaries] to reach out, to open up dialogue about the future of 
the people of this island...and unionists might have a different view and that’s ok... after decades of war each of 
us can share, and empathise, with those who have been hurt, we’re very mindful, were not here 
triumphalistically [sic] we’re here very mindful, when we remember our patriot dead of the  hurt we have 
inflicted on others...our society is in a different place than it was forty years ago.35 
This statement sits at a rhetorical level within the Republican approach to commemoration; 
their commemorations have not become spaces to debate ‘armed struggle’ or give voice to its 
victims. We might hardly expect that given the sacral and validating nature of 
commemoration as a political ritual. Yet it does serve as a signal to the Republican base that 
there are different interpretations and allegiances within memory and political identity, which 
cannot be ignored. Such assertations have continued at commemorations over recent years; 
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Michelle O’Neill, the current  President of Sinn Féin asserted at the 2018 Easter Rising 
commemoration that  
Republicans and Unionists have conflicting narratives, conflicting histories and conflicting allegiances. That’s 
the reality.  Part of the journey to reconciliation is about recognising that to be the case. Much hurt has been 
caused, and real pain inflicted on all sides of the community. It takes time to heal those wounds and to build a 
new society together where we all respect each other.36 
This may not be a venue which provides particularly effective outreach, but it does send a 
message about difficult and diverging narratives direct to the Republican base. 
 
The partisan commemoration of periods of political violence in Lebanon also exhibits an 
adaptive aspect that expresses sentiments of cross communal rapprochement. 
Commemoration has been used to cross sectarian boundaries and demonstrate solidarity 
between Christian and Muslim at memorials sites such as the Amal party controlled Qana 
memorial in southern Lebanon, and also in Beirut’s Martyrs Square.37 Samir Geagea, head of 
the Maronite Lebanese Forces has used the annual Lebanese Forces Martyrs Mass,  a vast 
commemorative gathering that incorporates a high degree of spectacle, not only to venerate 
and invoke their martyrs of the civil war, but also to apologise for excesses that the Lebanese 
Forces may have committed and to ask forgiveness from those they had harmed.38 A similar 
process of publicly critical reflection has been undertaken by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt of 
the Progressive Socialist Party.39 
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Druze-Christian conflict memory is of some importance. The Druze-Christian conflict known 
as the ‘Mountain War’ saw extensive communal blood-letting, and the ethnic cleansing of the 
Christian community from the Chouf mountain region. An intensely bitter memory of 
sectarian conflict, it is now used as a platform for a process of ‘Mountain Reconciliation’ 
between Druze and Christian political partisans.40 Indeed, leaders of Druze and Christian 
parties have attended services together. This process began with the visit of Maronite 
Patriarch Sfier to the region in 2001, and since then Druze and Christian party leaders have 
engaged in a process of commemoration of this event to aid reconciliation and foster the 
return of former Christian residents. During events commemorating the Mountain War, and 
Sfier’s reconciliatory visit, Geagea has referred to the mountain war as an ‘absurd war’ that 
should never have happened; rival Christian leader Michel Aoun has called for the building 
of memorials to the dead of all sects, effectively viewing ‘Mountain Reconciliation’ as a 
model for wider Lebanese rapprochement through mutual respect for each community’s dead, 
and using the collective memory of the conflict to take a warning from history: 
To revive our collective memory, to clear our conscience, and to draw lessons for the future, I call on our people in Mount 
Lebanon and in all the Lebanese regions to establish in their own cities and towns a commemorative monument holding the 
names of their martyrs, all of their martyrs, wherever and however they fell. And let this day of every year be the day where 
the Lebanese people visit these monuments and pray for the souls of their martyrs asking for their forgiveness and promising 
them never to go back to civil strife. The ability to revive the memory, to clear the conscience, to draw lessons, and the 
courage it takes to ask for forgiveness from these martyrs is the measure of one’s ability to live in a safe, constructive, and 
secure community. This is the challenge that faces us today, so let’s meet it in front of ourselves and the whole world.41 
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These processes represent progress, and commemoration is clearly being used by elites to 
signal a reconciliatory impulse to the political base, as well as to other confessional parties. 
Yet, there should be caution too. Geagea’s apology was framed within an understanding that 
his militiamen were undertaking their ‘national duty’ during the conflict and that the 
‘exploitation’ of their admitted mistakes for present political purposes should stop.42 Clearly, 
partisan commemorative outreach is limited by the need to maintain the overall legitimacy of 
one’s own movement in the past, and through the memory of that, in the present too. 
In the Lebanese context commemoration is used to create a sense of political solidarity 
between certain confessional parties.  Since the independence intifada (The ‘Cedar Spring’ of 
2005), sectarian politics has exhibited a gravitational pull towards two camps: the March 14th 
alliance (now comprising the Future Movement (largely Sunni), the Kata’eb (largely 
Christian) and the Lebanese Forces (Christian). In opposition is the pro-Syrian March 8th 
bloc; comprising Amal (Shia), Free Patriotic Movement (largely Christian), Hezbollah (Shia), 
the Marada movement (Christian) and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (non-sectarian 
but with strong links to the Greek Orthodox). The Druze Progressive Socialist Party has 
oscillated between the two camps over time. Party organisation remains confessional, but the 
necessity of building alliances that further both particular communal interests, and shared 
goals, necessitates the formation of a sense of solidarity and commonality in the present, and 
which may be projected to the future. This is not easy given a history of sectarian blood-
letting during the Lebanese civil war.  Yet, commemoration of past acts of violence, in the 
                                                          
42 Daily Star [Beirut], ‘Geagea Marks Anniversary of Mountain Reconciliation, Calls for 
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form of martyrdom, has proved a useful mechanism in creating a shared sense of belonging 
between confessional parties.  
 
The memory of the assassinated Future Movement leader Rafik Hariri has proved particularly 
powerful in this regard.43  Statuary, monuments and a large tomb housing Hariri’s remains 
are powerful sites of memory in downtown Beirut and complimenting this is a large annual 
commemoration bringing together not simply the supporters of the Future Movement, but 
leaders and followers of the other parties (predominantly Christian) which together form the 
March 14th bloc. An important facet of Hariri’s memory is that he has become a symbol of 
March 14th in toto, and more than that, a symbol of independent nationhood. His 
commemorations can thus help construct a sense of overarching national identity that is often 
weakened and undermined by confessional identification and political organisation. Christian 
and Sunni politicians send messages of solidarity, shared goals, and the commonality of 
shared national fealty at his commemorations.44  Hariri is a recent martyr, and his political 
positions prior to his assassination enable a seamless weaving into current March 14th 
narratives of solidarity.  
Interestingly, another martyr is also invoked, one whose death occurred during the civil war 
and who predated the cross confessional alliance of the ‘Cedar Spring’. Bashir Gemayel, the 
venerated Christian Maronite political and militia leader, has also been presented in 
commemorations and public memory as a ‘forefather of March 14th’, not simply by the 
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affiliated Christian parties, but by all parties within the March 14th bloc.45 Media related to 
the Hariri political family has also celebrated his memory in this way.  This may at first seem 
strange; Gemayel was after all the leader of a sectarian faction, politically and militarily, in a 
communal civil war which saw much Maronite Christian and Sunni Muslim mutual conflict 
and victimisation. Yet, his memory invokes similarities with the more modern 
commemoration of Hariri. He was ardent in his support of a Lebanese identity and Lebanese 
sovereignty; and he too was assassinated by political forces which were understood to be 
hostile to the exercise of sovereignty by that state. A Christian partisan of the civil war is thus 
linked to the Sunni moderniser of the post war era; although different in background they are 
presented as having strong similarities that serve to unite different confessional groups in the 
present: They held respected high office, they wished for a strong and sovereign Lebanon, 
and they were both martyred by the enemies of that goal. 
The pragmatic use of communal memory is also a feature of Hezbollah’s programme of 
commemoration.  Certainly, Hezbollah’s use of public memory reflects communal concerns 
(projecting the power of the Shia community, creating a public sphere of Islamic identity, and 
outbidding its Shia competitor for political support). However, it has also crafted 
commemoration of ‘resistance’ to complement  moves towards ‘Lebanonisation’, even if that 
remains only a partial shift.46 Hezbollah has also used the memory of the ‘resistance’ to 
establish credibility and legitimacy for itself as an authentically Lebanese entity – one whose 
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purpose is to protect the state from the Israeli threat and not to act primarily as a communal 
militia, a state within a state,  or foreign surrogate, all charges which have been made by the 
March 14th bloc (frequently during their own commemorations). The extensive museum 
complex at Mleeta, the ‘Spider’s Web’ temporary exhibition in the southern suburbs of 
Beirut, billboard commemorative posters, and commemorative speeches by Hezbollah leader 
Hassan Nasrallah have each played to aspects of this ‘Lebanonisation’. As well as deflecting 
the charges brought by their March 14th rivals, it may also help to mollify Hezbollah’s 
Christian allies that its guns will not be turned on the Lebanese, and that it too values a 
Lebanese identity and sovereign state. 
Whilst communal memory can be pragmatically remodelled to project a cross communal 
flavour, it nevertheless retains a deeply ingrained communal core. In short, its most important 
component remains its ability to bind a communal group and provide appropriate narratives 
and symbols. The principle value of Gemayel’s memory is to project a ‘muscular 
Maronitism’47 for Christian political parties, a public memory which evokes strength and 
optimism for a group which has been politically weakened and feels a certain political 
disenchantment in the present.  The public memory of Hariri too has seen a partial re 
sectarianisation, as Sunni symbolism edges out more cross confessional invocation.48 Despite 
‘Lebanonisation’, Hezbollah’s commemoration remains largely centred on its building of an 
Islamic ‘milieu’. Yet, the ability of communal memory to adapt to a cross communal form 
remains noteworthy and has served as a pragmatic political mechanism of alliance building 
and communication between confessional sects. 
Rethinking Partisan Memory– Conceptualising Adaptive Commemoration 
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Daniel Bar-Tal has offered the analysis, based on extensive research in Israel and Palestine, 
that processes of commemoration simply act to constantly regenerate narratives which 
sharpen boundaries and harden animosities. As such they become ‘concrete investments’ for 
political actors and their publics to continue peace inhibiting struggle 
…in times of conflict, and especially intractable conflict, rituals and ceremonies contribute to the continuation of the 
conflict.  Their contents fuel public animosity towards the enemy while urging the society’s members to fulfil their patriotic 
duties in the conflict.  As such, they serve as an important socialisation and cultural factor, ideologizing the conflict.49 
This may well apply in conditions of ‘hot’ war but in a more peaceful milieu, even if still 
beset by deep communal divisions, stasis, crisis, and occasional outbreaks of violence, a more 
nuanced appreciation of political ritual can be developed that uncovers a phenomenon we can 
conceptualise as adaptive commemoration. Reflecting on the discussion above in relation to 
Lebanon and Irish Republicanism in Northern Ireland we can observe that adaptive 
commemoration serves a number of functions in relation to the changes and tensions in a 
peace process or political ‘unsettlement’; these relate to the maintenance of constituency 
cohesion, the legitimising of political shifts, and the signalling of potential relations with 
other communities.  Adaptive shifts can thus see partisan memory partly retooled to peaceful 
acclimatisation.  In doing so, adaptive commemoration comprises a triad of constitutive, 
ideological, and communicative roles, all processes of fundamental importance to political 
groupings, particularly in the welter of peace processing. Commemoration then,  is not 
political window dressing or a social epiphenomenon. This fundamentally political triad is 
common to political commemoration generally, but in its adaptive form it deserves a closer 
inspection by those interested in the study or support of peacebuilding, for several reasons.   
Adaptive commemoration can be used to reassure and bind constituents (and possibly deflect 
                                                          
49   Daniel Bar-Tal, ‘Collective Memory of Physical Violence: its Contribution to the Culture 
of Violence’, in Ed Cairns and Mícheál D. Roe, (Basingstoke; Palgrave Macmillan, 2003),   
89 
25 
 
the criticism of spoilers) in transitions; and it can establish political continuity for an 
evolution from past violent resistance to present forms of peaceful advancement. It may also 
function to rhetorically signal a new approach to relations with other communities; although 
in this latter case it is worth pointing out that the rhetoric may mainly be used to acclimatise 
‘in group’ constituencies to new tones in dialogue and modes of engagement. ‘Out’ groups 
may take the rhetorical signalling with a large pinch of salt, or it may be largely inaudible to 
them.  
Partisan commemoration can thus be used to reorder or reframe the goals of political actors 
away from the more ideological frames of the past even if it is an invocation of that same 
past. This may seem counterintuitive, or at least very difficult, but in fact reaching for, or 
constructing, approval from a group’s history may be a necessary condition for success in 
periods of negotiation and political shifts. 
 
Inclusive Commemoration as Peacebuilding - A Case Study of the ‘Decade of 
Centenaries’ 
Partisan commemoration can be shaped to espouse narratives that have utility in underwriting 
peace.  But there are difficulties for peacebuilding too, and we must remember its Janus face. 
It can also work to reinforce boundaries with fixed, simplified notions of the historical ‘good’ 
and the communal ‘other’; and it can project support for militancy and violence that can 
repulse that ‘other’, inhibiting reconciliation, or at least damaging a sense of a new peaceful 
dispensation.   In addressing these problems, much of the literature on engaging with memory 
in divided societies emphasises various lines of approach, which we can condense here as:  
the need for commemoration to show multiple perspectives and interpretations;  
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to engage with scholarship so that commemorative work has a firm historical and factual 
basis; 
to realise that a most important part of commemoration is the process of engaging groups 
themselves; 
to challenge stereotypical constructions of identities; 
and that the aim of commemoration should be to deepen and broaden understanding of the 
past, and present identities.50 
In amalgamating these approaches, we may conceptualise them as Critical-Inclusive 
Commemoration; a form of relating to the past which seeks to provide a pluralistic space for 
engagement whilst combining it with a measure of critical inquiry and reflection, informed by 
evidence and a more ‘historical’ method. The pluralising and critical aspects work to support 
one another, as a mixture of voices provides a mixture of interpretations; multiple 
interpretations may better allow a role for debate and evaluation, rather than the automatic 
delivery of  fixed, familiar narratives. This opening out of a critical space, may encourage 
still wider engagement. We shall see that these broad points are reflected in the principles that 
have underlined some work of the ‘Decade of Centenaries’ within Northern Ireland, and 
which have met with some success. This makes it a most useful short case study of attempts 
to deal with difficult collective memories in the setting of ethno-national contestation. 
A Politically ‘Live’ Centennial: Unpacking the ‘Decade of Centenaries’ 
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Although there has been input and support from the UK, Ireland, and the power sharing 
government of Northern Ireland, the ‘Decade’ is not a centrally driven project or programme. 
Rather it can be pictured as an agglomeration of self-directed activity involving public 
bodies, political organisations, local authorities, ‘single identity’ community groups, cross 
community groups, libraries and museums, and the wider cultural sector. The ‘Decade’ 
covers the period of 1912 to 1923, a period which saw not only many formative events in 
modern Irish history, but events which are regularly evoked, tapped, and commemorated in 
modern political discourse and party political commemoration.51 Events include the Ulster 
Covenant, the Easter Rising, The Battle of the Somme, the foundation of the Irish and Ulster 
Volunteers, the Anglo-Irish War, partition, the foundation of the Northern Ireland state and 
the Irish civil war; in short highly sensitive moments of mobilisation, violence, ‘blood 
sacrifice’,  identity formation, and political fractures between and within ethno-national 
constituencies.  The events may have happened one hundred years ago, but they have had a 
direct symbolic relevance, and indeed utility, to many political actors in contemporary 
Northern Ireland. Interpretations of these events vary markedly between ethno-national 
constituencies within Northern Ireland, yet the memory of these events is not simply 
politically charged and sensitive, but also politically valuable to actors. Centenary events of 
2016 proved a particular case in point: 1916 saw the ‘Easter Rising’ a foundational moment 
in the Irish Republican project, and the demonstration of a mythic blood sacrifice. The year 
also saw the ‘Battle of the Somme’, when Ulster Unionists evoke a similar blood sacrifice 
narrative in relation to British patriotism and loyalty.  The invocations of the ‘Rising’ and the 
Somme feature heavily within Irish Republican, and Unionist or Loyalist collective memory 
respectively. The memories then are valuable, – powerful symbolic and foundational 
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moments that are supposed to reveal a given constituency’s identity, values, and place in 
history. Consequently, much commemorative work is undertaken by current political groups 
to establish connection to, and continuity with, these historic moments, and the political 
groupings active at the time. There is a consequent risk that these commemorations can 
solidify boundaries and simplify identities in ways that conflict with cross community 
engagement. 
 
Principles and Activities of the ‘Decade’ 
As noted above, the period of the commemorative ‘Decade’ is an agglomeration of groups 
and activities, and there are enormous tensions at work in invoking memory from this period. 
The Community Relations Council (CRC), an ‘arms-length’ body of the Northern Ireland 
government saw challenges inherent in this invocation of memory, which would directly 
impact on its remit as a promoter of better inter-communal and inter-cultural relations in 
Northern Ireland; as such it has become an important actor in the ‘Decade’, though given its 
ethos and small size, by no means a directing one.  The organisation’s fear was that on many 
occasions commemoration had been used to ‘ritualise and harden the boundaries between 
groups who have been in conflict’, seize an ownership of historical events to further narrower 
political interests, and silence other narratives that may ‘contradict or complicate’ more 
partisan and simplified understandings of the past.52 The CRC was explicit in acknowledging 
that commemorated events were not simply part of a thorny history that would be fought out 
in the pages of historical journals, but had a continuing constitutive function for political 
communities in Northern Ireland having ‘shaped the sense of British and Irish identity’ in the 
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recent past and present.53 Yet, as well as bringing challenges, the ‘Decade’ might also 
provide opportunity for engaging with clashing identities and narrower invocations of 
memory in the present: by seeking and facilitating the widest participation of actors, and 
inculcating an educational approach informed by historical research there was an opportunity 
to ‘dispel myths’ and make connections to ‘hidden history’ relating to gender, labour, and the 
international environment. In other words, useful mythologies might be counterpoised with 
historical research, and simplified forms of memory could be partly prised out of their ethno-
national capsule.  
Although not foregrounded in their analysis, what seems implicit in the Council’s 
understanding is that the ‘Decade’ may act as a stalking horse in approaching the still more 
difficult memory of the modern ‘Troubles’ by providing ‘important opportunities to develop 
our understanding of how marking important anniversaries should be fostered in the public 
space’.54  Moreover, the CRC viewed the violent and revolutionary ‘Decade’ as a lens with 
which to interrogate contemporary understandings of  ‘what we mean by democracy and the 
nature of political change’ which might have the ‘potential to reinforce the development of 
political and civic culture’. We might further speculate that if the ‘Decade’ remains live 
history, readily reached for by ethno-national actors in framing politics and constituting 
identity, it nevertheless is of sufficient historical distance to allow for a more critical and 
reflective approach. Crucially, this might act as a small wedge, opening a chink in narratives 
of more recent conflict to allow similarly reflective scrutiny. 
Seeing both challenges to, and openings for, memory as a peacebuilding exercise the CRC 
engaged a program designed to facilitate and guide a wide variety of organisations who were 
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undertaking commemorations related to the decade. Funding formed part of the operation, but 
the main thrust came in the form of enabling a variety of different groups to network, 
compare approaches and possibly collaborate. The key intervention was the formulation of a 
series of ‘Decade Principles’ which the CRC (and its partner the Heritage Lottery Fund) 
sought to promulgate in workshops, public meetings, and one-on-one interactions with 
commemorating groups. The principles stated that commemorations should: 
Start from the historical facts; 
Recognise the implications and consequences of what happened;  
Understand that different perceptions and interpretations exist; 
and show how events and activities can deepen understanding of the period.55 
Engagement was open to all, but groups seeking funding support needed to follow these 
thematic and organising principles. Politically partisan groups were unlikely to buy in to such 
an arrangement, but many others were. Crucially, this did include single identity groups 
hailing from a particular ethno-national community, and local authorities which might be 
majority controlled by parties of a particular ethno-national stripe.  A variety of cross 
community groups, trade unions, and broad based historical and cultural organisations made 
up the remainder of participants. This ‘critical’ commemoration took the form of plays, 
debates, lectures, classes, workshops and training events, installations, gatherings, and 
exhibitions.  What resulted was a local catalysing of commemorative activity which clearly 
engaged with inclusive, reflective and critical approaches. Something of the historical method 
was thus mainstreamed into many local commemorations. Differing interpretations were 
foregrounded, myths challenged, internal diversity within ‘bounded’ communities revealed, 
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and a deeper contextualisation occurred, allowing themes relating to class, international 
influence, and gender to pierce ethno-nationally encapsulated understandings of history.56 
Partisan forms of commemoration were not squeezed out (there was neither hope nor 
intention), but they were counterbalanced; the result was that public discourse was better 
primed to engage with a nuanced and reflective understanding of a politically valued and 
formative, but highly sensitive, past. Independent surveys of commemorating organisations 
have taken place which add corroboration to this view. It was revealed that many 
organisations understood the key features of their commemorative programmes as 
recognising difference, including multiple stories, allowing people to reflect, highlighting 
shared experiences, and humanising histories. Most were aware of the ‘Decade’ Principles, 
and it emerged that the best practice guidelines produced by the CRC were widely used. 
Two-thirds of organisations aimed to include multiple stories. 57 A small majority of a 2017 
survey reported that there was an increase in the number of participants who had a greater 
awareness of different cultures and felt more comfortable with acknowledging cultural 
diversity, whilst 50% stated that participants were more open to discussion with those who 
have diverse or opposing opinions. A large majority (70%) of organisations claimed that 
increased learning in relation to contested histories and commemoration itself was the overall 
effect of the commemorative work whilst 84% believed that their organisations were 
achieving better contextual understanding of the period within their audience. A direct impact 
on lowering inter communal tensions was realistically muted but still significant, with 35% of 
organisations believing that their organisations commemorative work had helped in this 
regard.58 The ‘Decade’ is only half complete; and caution is necessary given that the second 
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half of the commemorative period will see events which reflect the living memory of the 
modern Troubles more closely, in terms of types of violence and their location. Yet, public 
and media discourse have as yet seen no sharpening of the memory of the period 1912-16 in a 
cultural battle between ethno-national groups despite their foundational importance. This is 
significant at a time of increased electoral polarisation in Northern Ireland. 
Conclusion: Approaches to Commemoration in Peacebuilding 
In examining commemoration in an ethno-national setting, we can see that partisan memory 
can be a hindrance to moves to improve inter-group relations through its sharpening of 
memories of conflict and opposition, and its ability to ideologise boundaries between groups, 
giving them a rather primordial depth. Yet, it can also serve as a pragmatic tool to acclimatise 
ethno-national groups to a more peaceful milieu even as it invokes past conflict. A problem 
remains that these processes can run on parallel tracks; adaptive commemoration might not 
sweep aside more ideological forms.  Consequently, there still remains a need for the 
fostering of a more critical-inclusive form of commemoration; one which can counter balance 
stereotyping or one-sided narratives, and help to prime public discourse in ways which would 
defuse cultural triggers that might exacerbate polarisation.  With that in mind, several 
propositions may be advanced in relation to partisan and inclusive commemoration, which 
might usefully inform interventions in relation to memory. 
Partisan Memory can be a Reputational Shield that Facilitates Moves to Peace Those 
forming interventions should be aware that even partisan commemoration has its benefits for 
peacebuilding. It is used to keep a political constituency together during testing times 
providing a means for leadership engagement with its base that mollifies doubters by 
invoking continuity. It can thus be a tool against splits and spoiling; particularly those groups 
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which attempt to yoke the memory of a militant past to the legitimisation of present day 
violent rejection. 
Partisan Memory Can Send Messages Supportive of Peace Partisan commemoration can 
partially reshape its own narratives so that they are more congruent with a peace-seeking 
environment; and it can signal to its own base how to engage with communal ‘out’ groups in 
more productive or reconciliatory ways. Such commemorations bring key political activists 
and constituencies together in a setting which allows the sacral, legitimising sheen of past 
heroes and shared values to be woven into new political signals, giving the latter a more 
digestible form. External actors may view partisan commemorations as unhelpful invocations 
of past enmity, but if they want to discourage such commemoration, there may be costs 
attending the obvious benefits.  
Critical and Reflective Approaches Remain Important Within ethno-nationally divided 
societies critical reflection should be facilitated in relation both to historical understandings, 
and the more communal or folkloric narratives of past conflict that percolate within partisan 
memory.  It is too much to expect politically organised ethno-national commemorations to 
reshape themselves so that they fully unpick and re-examine narratives which continue to 
have a high emotional salience and political value for them.  What is achievable is to 
facilitate and foster parallel forms of ‘softer’ commemoration which allow more for a more 
critical analysis of the past, in which both familiar and unfamiliar narratives circulate. This 
might entail challenging simplified understandings or stereotypes of political communities, 
movements and actors. It can involve spotlighting inconsistencies, mythologies, errors, or 
values now out of step with modern custom. This can be a difficult process; commemorative 
forms which allow for active enquiry would be well suited but can be labour intensive and 
difficult to design. Whatever their design, these parallel commemorations should have a 
relevance for, and the involvement of, local communities or they will not take. Partisan 
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commemorations, backed by local political forces skilled in mobilisation and organisation, 
would overshadow them otherwise. 
Complicate Identity Ethno-national commemoration may be abundant and may reflect the 
salience of ethno-national identity in a given political setting; but however powerful and 
important it is for an individual, it remains only one form of identification within social life. 
As such,  purely partisan forms of memory can be reductive, particularly when in the hands 
of political elites and entrepreneurs. Portraying different forms of identification should thus 
also feature as an important aspect to be encouraged. This could attach to the pattern of 
parallel commemoration as outlined above. History telling and commemoration which makes 
adequate room for both gender and class may be important in this regard (indeed they often 
strongly intersect) as they can underline cross cutting histories. Ethno-national identity itself  
may not be blithely imagined away, but is supplemented in a manner  which renders 
boundaries more permeable. Similarly, stories of those who crossed boundaries, or perhaps 
acted as ‘good Samaritans’,59 or even noting events which demonstrated co-operation by 
political leaders can give a more nuanced, and humane understanding of a difficult past.  It 
would also be important to unpack monolithic understandings of ethno-national movements-  
and instead underline that these were movements in which there existed significant internal 
tensions.  
Engage with Earlier Memories of Conflict First In a divided society riven by the memory of 
recent conflict it may be useful to take a more oblique approach to fostering commemorations 
supportive of peace. Interventions relating to commemoration might more easily engage with 
earlier histories of conflict between communities first. Establishing norms of historical 
veracity, encouraging debate, and ensuring that multiple points of view are expressed may be 
                                                          
59 Dudai, Ron. "Rescues for Humanity: Rescuers, Mass Atrocities, and Transitional Justice." Human Rights 
Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2012): 1-38. 
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easier when the events are at the limits of, or beyond, living memory. The events may still be 
of a high political value to groups, or formative of identity, and thus sensitised.  But there is 
sufficient distance with which to robustly engage. Having insinuated a more reflective and 
critical approach to earlier ethno-national memory, it may partially travel ‘up the line’ to 
recent narratives of conflict. 
Some of these points have been addressed before; but the ‘Decade’ has, and will continue to 
provide a test bed for their efficacy, and important information will be revealed about the 
limitations in developing inclusive commemoration too. The pragmatic and adaptive aspects 
of partisan memory provide both a problem and support for peacebuilding intervention; they 
are useful as they have reassured constituencies, and help keep the group together when the 
waters of peace become choppy. Yet, a corollary remains that they project narratives that may 
deepen boundaries and simplify history as a means to shape political identity, and in societies 
riven by ethno-national conflict, history is seldom simple. 
 
